The decision to close a growing business
The group closed the domestic business I ran while it was still growing. Export demand up, lamb supply down, fuel up, and a plant with no spare capacity. I sat on the team that made the call, and it was the right one.
The business I ran was growing when the group decided to close it. I sat on the leadership team that made that call, and I backed it. This is the first of a short series on how a wind down works when it's done properly, starting with why it happened.
United Meat Co was the domestic sales and distribution arm of a meat processing group. I'd started it with no customers and built a solid book of wholesalers and large butchers across Brisbane and Melbourne. Sales were growing, the team was settled and the systems worked. On its own, it was a good business.
But a domestic sales arm doesn't sit on its own. It sits inside a group with a plant, and that plant has a fixed amount it can process. What the group earns depends on where each kilo goes. Over a few months, four things moved at once.
Export demand went up. Overseas buyers were paying more for the same lamb, and Australian lamb export values hit records. Some markets grew by a quarter to a half in a year.
Supply went down. The national flock had been shrinking for years after a long run of destocking, and lamb numbers coming through the yards were running around ten percent below the year before. Processors were competing for fewer animals, so every lamb cost more at the saleyard. Prices went through levels nobody in the industry had seen.
Fuel went up. Diesel jumped about 40 percent in a little over a week at one point, and transport is a real slice of what a carton of meat costs by the time it reaches a customer. Every delivery we ran cost more, and so did every truck bringing product up from the plant.
And the plant was full. There was no spare capacity on the chain to serve both markets. The domestic business was about 5 percent of the group's turnover, and every lamb processed for it was a lamb the group couldn't sell overseas at a better margin. When the plant is the constraint, the question is simply where each head earns the most.
Put those together and the maths is simple. Domestic customers can only absorb so much of a price rise before they buy something else. Export buyers were paying more and asking for more. Taking chain space away from export to supply 5 percent of the business made no sense. Putting the plant's full capacity into export and stopping domestic trading was backing the stronger business. It wasn't a judgment on the domestic team or the work. It was the numbers.
I wasn't told the decision. I was consulted on it. I sat on the group's leadership team with the owner, CEO, CFO and COO, and I'd been reporting the domestic margin every month, so I could see the same numbers everyone else at the table could. I gave it my blessing, even though it meant winding down a business we'd worked hard to build. Tough decision. Right decision.
The job for me from that point was to understand it, not fight it, and then run the wind down as well as we'd run the growth. Customers, staff, suppliers, cash and systems, in that order. Each one is its own post.
